Revolutionary Power Rankings (October 2025)

Here are my two cents on how I think the national politics of various countries will evolve going out to 2050 or so. These hunches will inform my future history worldbuilding down the line, so it’s important to think them through beforehand. Naturally, I wouldn’t judge each country in isolation in order to establish an overall prognosis on the present world-system, but since it’s hard to describe a chaotic system in total, it may be better if I first assess each country’s tendencies in isolation and then see how the cookie crumbles altogether.

Category One: High Potential ​

These are countries that are sufficiently close to becoming the Next Big Thing in World Revolutionary History that I would genuinely consider moving there if revolution were to break out. It’s an exceedingly rare environment, but it tends to become a bit of a vortex if sufficiently successful, redefining global politics around itself by inaugurating a new epoch of political possibility.

• Any of the Institutionally Strong Pink Tide Countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico)
  • Latin America has a massive socialist tradition that is only kept in check by American imperial power, which to be fair also created a lot of that fervor through negative polarization. While most of LatAm has thus seen various left populist movements come and go over the past few decades, some of them show a stronger institutional basis than others in terms of party-building and ties to organized labor. In my view, it’s only a matter of time before the ping-ponging between Left and Right resolves into a full break with the liberal democratic model. It’s arguably what happened in Venezuela already, but that country also has its own problems with Dutch Disease and proved easy enough to isolate internationally, much like Cuba before it. If America’s grip on the region wanes and a few more of these countries entrench their leftism, we may finally begin to see Some Serious Shit.
• An Unspecified Country in the Mediterranean
  • My supposition here is that the basic social energies which gave rise to Great Recession era populism (Syriza, M5S, Podemos) have not been sufficiently resolved, nor have the causes of the Arab Spring. Something along these lines is likely to recur when the next systemic crisis hits the region, and with the ever-accelerating incidence of desertification and climate migration, the situation is only going to get more dire. What keeps me from making a more specific prediction is that each country I might name as an example (Italy, Spain, Egypt) is at present leaning away from a left-wing resolution. Thus, while it seems unlikely in the grand scheme of things that none of these countries wouldn’t see a radical leftist force emerge with time, I can’t say where it would happen exactly.
• Rojava
  • I don’t think the Apoists are long for this world, located as they are between the twin terrors of Ankara and Damascus, but they’re still a beacon of Actual “Actually Existing Socialism”, so I gotta hope that they’ll prove me wrong.

Category Two: Some Assembly Required ​

Countries that have some promising social movements or a perennial tradition of social struggle, but which still need a bit of a push to move into Category One.

• France or Britain
  • I’m grouping these two together because they’re kind of in the same boat, though each has (dis)advantages the other lacks. Establishment forces in both countries are rapidly weakening, even if in Britain they’re holding on to power through parliamentary meddling, while in France such maneuvers derive from a strong executive. At the same time, I’m not sure the insurgent right wing in either country will be able to build the institutional power they’d need for a long-lasting illiberal regime. Their left wings meanwhile have a lot to say for themselves, and I maintain the La France Insoumise is the most promising party model in the West, being rooted in a distinct intersectional working-class constituency. Judging by their recent communiques, this is also what Your Party is trying to do in Britain, and it would be great for them to be unshackled from Labour’s corpse. Or from the EU’s corrupting influence, to be honest. All in all, there’s reason for hope in both these places, though a left-wing turn in one of the two would have an uncertain effect on the latter. For more on that, see below.
• Japan or (South) Korea
  • Here we have two East Asian liberal democracies that are past their peak economically and suffer a combination of murderous work culture and general social alienation. The reason to be at all optimistic about either of them is that South Korea has a fairly activistic political culture, and Japan’s uniparty is declining by the day. Once again though, I am hedging my bets by putting these countries in categories two and four simultaneously.
• Myanmar
  • The civil war in Myanmar is ignored by a lot of people, even though it shows some unprecedented changes in the country’s history of internecine warfare. While there’s always been some level of conflict between the Tatmadaw and the country’s peripheral peoples, now there is a significant rebel coalition within the central regions themselves, one which is nominally committed to the country’s federalization and democratization. While this is hardly the left-wing uprising I would prefer, there is still some truth to the idea that liberal revolutions pave the way for their socialist counterparts. Given the weakness of the junta in keeping it all together, I really think Myanmar is headed in the right direction, albeit at a terrible human cost.
• The Chinese People
  • I’m separating China into two parts here since I am highly ambivalent about its prospects, but not in a way where they fit into Category Six. On the one hand, you have young Chinese people increasingly confronting the prospects of a slowing economy, combined with a historical legacy of genuine attempts at socialist communalism (however flawed) that might be taken up as a remedy. Really, any Marxist should have an easy time diagnosing China’s ills, and I think even the state-affiliated intellectuals know it. Properly assembled, the popular capacities of the Chinese people could be used for a lot of good, but much depends on whether the state would enable, co-opt, or outright sabotage such movements. Hence why I treat the Party-State as a separate entity here.

Category Three: The Center WILL Hold, Dammit​

Nothing Ever Happens, as they say, and the establishment is sufficiently strong in these countries to make sure it never does.

• The European Union
  • The EU was arguably founded in opposition to Things Happening, they’re as close as one gets to a real-life Moralist International. Up until a short while ago, that made both the Left and Right mad at them in equal measure, but now the latter has realized that a common border regime actually works in the haplogroup’s favor. Better to enlist periphery states like Tunisia to do the migrant culling for you. Short of a left-populist break in one of the core EU members, or else a determined Russophile somehow winning post-2022, I think the EU as we know it is here to stay, and largely along its contemporary center-right lines.
• The Chinese State
  • I’d like to think that the new hegemon-in-waiting would vindicate gradualist socialism once and for all, but it’s not looking like it will. The CCP’s re-politicization under Xi has one goal, the continuation of its own rule. While it may be forced into various Tough Decisions when the economy eventually levels off, there would need to be a great deal of political entrepreneurship within the Party itself in order to get back on the Socialist Road. In other words, it would need to foster the people’s capacity for autonomy and collectivity rather than try and shatter any movement it can’t control. I’ve not seen many signs of that kind of turn. While I’m on the topic, I don’t think we’re getting a Chinese Century either, just because you can’t substitute American Unipolarity in a stagnating world. It’ll be multipolar at best, and strangely nonpolar at worst.
• African Union members in good standing (especially ECOWAS and the East African Community)
  • Many future histories contain a hunch that Africa will be the shining jewel of the world economy by the end of this century. Were the metabolic cycle of capitalism to go on for a few more cycles, this might very well be the case. Unfortunately, I don’t think it will. For Africa to rise, others must be willing to fall, or be made to do so by a convincing competitive edge. There simply isn’t enough room in the world system for Africa to become anything other than a peripheral and expendable surplus producer. Still, so long as the system exists, the dream will be there, and it will continue to exert a moderating and disciplining force on the ‘developing’ economies of the continent. All for the sake of a payday that may never arrive.
• Most if not all of ASEAN
  • South-East Asia is one of the most dynamic parts of the world, both socially and economically, and yet it often gets ignored amid the tussle of greater powers like India and China. Given its residual economic power, there’s a good case to be made for its continued political stabilization through the spoils of late capitalist development. At the same time, I would not be surprised if the combination of harsh climate change impacts and large urban populations ends up spawning a significant civil uprising in one or several of these countries. What makes the difference in this region is the extent of its premature deindustrialization; if its domestic efforts fail to substitute for declining or isolated manufacturing hubs elsewhere, its prospects will be more dire altogether.

Category Four: Highway to Hell​

Postliberalism and/or neo-fascism is getting more popular, we can all sense it, and these countries are eager to join the club.

• Germany
  • As Germany goes, so goes Europe. While the EU is likely to obsess over its own stability in the wake of a destabilizing world, it will be Germany that sets the standard on what ‘stability’ means to begin with. In this, I think its establishment forces are strong enough to ward off a true reactionary revolution, it’s just that they’ll do so by including the AfD as a junior party of government. Yes, this will make the overall system more cruel and militaristic, but it will do so in a way that keeps the bond markets stable. And isn’t that what really matters?
• France or Britain
  • They’re back! Again, the reason these countries are in both category two and four is because their predicament is so similar: the center cannot hold, but what will replace it. Still, in their potential rightward drift, there are subtle but important differences. First, there’s the fact that Britain can afford to be more of a rogue actor now that it’s not beholden to the EU; at the same time, the fact that France is still a part of it might influence its rightward drift if the EU itself grows ever more conservative. Secondly, any French neo-fascism would likely derive from the considerable power of the presidency in the Fifth Republic (which is also part of why LFI is so eager to start a Sixth Republic). In Britain, by contrast, decades of austerity have eroded state capacity to such an extent that I might as well expect its authoritarianism to derive from the relative grassroots, as seen in its recent racial pogroms. Still, if we’re judging by electoral prospects alone, then both Reform and the FN are shoo-ins for their respective elections, which can strike at any moment. You hate to see it.
• Japan or (South) Korea
  • And here’s the other side of the coin. Anyone keeping up with the politics of these countries can’t help but have noticed their concerning anti-feminist movements, the scourge of the Moonies (no relation), or the general revisionism regarding their respective strands of 20th century autocracy. While I maintain that the establishment simply cannot hold in these late late late stage economies (Japan especially), there’s no reason the resulting chaos wouldn’t lead them rightward. My assessment above may thus be unduly optimistic. Still, to think that the problems they face have no left-wing solution, or that those who’d suffer this rightward drift are not thinking of how to resist it, is to reinforce a stereotype of East Asian conservatism that I believe is fundamentally faulty.
• Syria
  • It was exhilarating to see the Assad regime toppled, but the Islamist compradors who have replaced it aren’t exactly a breath of fresh air. Sanctions relief will do some good, but climate change is only going to exacerbate its thoroughgoing devastation (there’s an ongoing drought last I checked), and serving as a proxy to Turkey or the West at large is not a popular proposition. While I think the situation could be worse, the ongoing standoffs with Israel and the SDF could destabilize the country all over again, not to mention the persecution of the Alawites. The Syrian people are not at peace yet.
• Turkey
  • I hate Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and wish the world would treat him as a war criminal for what he’s done to the Kurds and to North Syria. Unfortunately, it doesn’t look like he’s going anywhere, and is instead trying to rid himself of the last bits of political opposition by arresting potential challengers and getting the PKK to disarm. We could still see a last-ditch united front to restore the one true faith (Kemalism), but I’d rather be pleasantly surprised than make a call I don’t believe in.

Category Five: Ontologically Evil​

Misery alone is unfortunately not always sufficient to cause Revolution, and these countries are in the kind of cesspit that you don’t tend to crawl out of without outside intervention. Literally Hitler, basically.

• India
  • One disappointing election will not undo the rot that is hindutva. In general, any replacement of the BJP based around some united front anti-authoritarianism is likely to fall apart in the long run. The ongoing destruction of the Naxalites also doesn’t bode well for India’s poorest. Unless some major ideological restructuring takes place here, I don’t see why Modi’s brand of fascism won’t just keep on trucking.
• El Salvador
  • Bukele must have read abolitionist critiques of the carceral state and thought “wow, we should have the prison-industrial complex over here!” The results are unsurprisingly horrific; I suppose crime has nominally gone down by imprisoning everyone with a surname, which is why I’m terrified that this kind of strategy can actually be used to build a domestic constituency. To Bukele, though, this doesn’t even really matter, as he’s managed to find a role for himself in the new world system as Guantanamo 2.0. In general, there’s an emergent tradition of sending one’s designated illegals and undesirables abroad, as we’ve seen various European countries try for the same. I’m not optimistic in either case.
• Russia
  • Putin may die eventually, but what indication is there that what comes after him will be better? As I see it, the scores of veterans generated on the Ukrainian Front are more likely to become squadristi than communists, and even the latter tendency has been thoroughly captured by the Putinist big tent. The best case scenario for now is for Russia to become a Chinese dependency, as this will at least keep it from making the kind of international moves that hurt everyone.
• Afghanistan
  • The country is already facing drought conditions and the Taliban isn’t going anywhere. There’s little else I need to say here.

Category Six: Fuck If I know​

Sometimes, the Contradictions(tm) are a little too great for me to judge which direction the situation will go in. Powerful Light, Powerful Dark, and all that. Yes, this is kind of a ‘get out of analysis free’ card, but I’d never claim omniscience.

• Argentina
  • Here’s a country I’m supposed to know a little more about, given that I’ve actually been there and now know a fair bit about its history. Unfortunately, the only constants in Argentinian history are Chaos and Peronism, in that order, and now even the latter appears eclipsed by Milei’s AnCap Insanity. Still, Peronism has a way of bouncing back, and Milei’s coalition is as corrupt as the rest of them; only significant US financial intervention can save him now. Where the forces that gave rise to Milei-ism will go after his fall remains to be seen, and while the corporatist autarky of the justicialists has come back in style, hyperinflation is always just a hop and a skip away. Were I a betting Moon, my heart would put them in Category One, and my brain would put them in Category Four. 

Category Seven: State Not Found​

There’s no reason to assume that we’re all going to make it, not when the intermediate IPCC prognosis is 2 degrees of warming by 2050. State failure is inevitable, especially in those regions that deserve it the least.

• All of the Arab Gulf States
  • You cannot serve both God and Mammon, especially when you’ve based your economy on the one resource that’s ruining the planet. I like to think that all of these slaveholding rentier aristocracies will go the way of the dodo, but maybe that’s perversely optimistic of me. Still, knowing what I do of Dubai’s infrastructure or the Saudis’ Neom, there’s no way these guys manage to pivot their economies in time. At most, the sovereign wealth funds will endure as the portfolio of the exiled leaderships.
• Israel
  • They’re destroying their international reputation as anything other than an apartheid state faster than even South Africa did back in the day. As for what will replace it, one would hope for some kind of binational secularism, but it may also just join the ranks of the Permanently Ungoverned World.
• Lebanon
  • Lebanon has been my go-to for understanding ungovernability in the 21st century. Sometimes I’ll say that all countries will be Lebanon in the future, but this is to flatten out the particular circumstances that made the modern-day Levant what it is. Still, the fact that there is a discrete dual power situation between the consociational Lebanese state and a prominent paramilitary force in the form of Hezbollah is surely worth noting. All such configurations are inherently unstable, and much like its arch-enemy to the South, I don’t think Lebanon as we know it is long for this world.
• The United States
  • I will admit this claim is bold for the sake of it, but hear me out. Is it really plausible that the US will go through six more presidential election cycles between now and 2050? Ever since the start of the rot—much of which goes back to 1776—state capacity has waned and the opposition has grown more anemic. All that remains is the boot and the face. Even America’s post-war raison d’etre in the form of its global empire is now beginning to fall apart, and I’d suggest it takes one more Vietnam-level conflict (likely against Iran) for the blowback to prove fatal. As for what replaces the moribund institutions of the city on the hill, my money’s on an inchoate mix of soft secession, local ungovernability, and some spasms of residual federal authority. It’d be 1991 on steroids, and may well come to define the 21st century as such. 
• The Multinational Corporation
  • What happened to Russia’s economy in 2022 is just a sign of things to come. As the global economy frays, expect international concerns to be broken up along national or regional lines. While there is hope for further economic integration in specific regions (ECOWAS, ASEAN, East Africa), this will be state-led rather than the result of pure market forces, which don’t really exist anyway. In the longer term, I don’t even see how a terminally stagnant global economy can afford these corporations except as purposeless monopolistic rentiers, which by their very form undermine the social reproduction that allows them to persist. What mode of social organization will follow that is utterly unknown, though it can’t be based around profit-seeking as we know it. That doesn’t mean it will be better than what we have now, but it will be different.